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1. Introduction
Canada and Spain both face the challenge of reconciling the po-
tentially mutually exclusive interests and values of distinct linguistic
communities, diverse regional entities and increasingly mobilized im-
migrant communities. In both countries, federalism has been a key
instrument used to reconcile unity with diversity. Canada’s federal
system was established in 1867, and the controversial issues that have
marked its history, especially since the 1960s, will be familiar to Catalans
and Spaniards: a powerful nationalist and linguistic movement in Que-
bec demanding ‘equality’ and ‘recognition’ or independence; con-
tentious debates about asymmetry in the distribution of powers bet-
ween the different regions; resentment over the perceived fiscal im-
balance between the provinces and the federal government; debates
about language policy, and the ways to recognize ‘minorities within
minorities’.
The main linguistic minority in Canada, the French-speaking
Québécois who represent slightly more than 20% of the Canadian
population, plays a similar role in the Canadian federation that the
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Catalan people play within Spain. With a relatively brief exception in
the late 1960’s, culminating in the ‘October crisis’ of 1970, when a
radical movement, the Front de la Libération du Québec, kidnapped
a British diplomat, and killed a Quebec cabinet minister, the nation-
alist movement has been completely peaceful and democratic. It has
embraced the democratic rules of the game both in Quebec and in
national politics. Like Catalonia, although unsuccessfully, the Quebec
government has demanded that Quebec be recognized as a nation or
‘distinct society’ within Canada. The debate is between a ‘dualist’ idea
of Canada as a bi-national entity, and other visions that see Canada
as a collection of provincial communities, as a ‘multicultural society,’
and as a society that blends three sets of nations – Canada, Quebec,
and ‘first nations,’ or Aboriginal peoples.
Another of Quebec’s main demands has been that greater asym-
metry be introduced into the federal distribution of powers in order
to reflect Quebec’s unique challenge as a predominantly French-
speaking society in an overwhelmingly English-speaking continent.
Like Catalonia, Quebec has used the federal system to implement
legislation to ensure the protection and promotion of the French lan-
guage in the province, to develop unique public policies responsive
to the values and concerns of Québécois, and to position itself in the
minds of Québécois as their ‘national government”.
In recent years, the capacity of Canadian federalism to continue
to provide a framework for the accommodation of its linguistic duality
and regional differences has been questioned. In 1995, Québécois
nationalists came within a few thousand votes of winning a referendum
calling for the secession of Quebec, though with a continuing economic
and political “partnership” with the rest of Canada. Thus, Canada
appears to illustrate the Janus-faced quality of federalism with re-
spect to the recognition and accommodation of ethnic, linguistic and
cultural differences. Federalism is at once a vehicle for accommoda-
tion; a way of reconciling the minority nations and groups to the
larger whole; and a device for perpetuating and institutionalizing the
very cleavages it is designed to manage, one which may provide the
institutional resources from which to launch a successful secession
movement. Canada adopted federalism in large measure as a means
to accommodate its linguistic duality and regional differences; but
the capacity of federalism to continue to provide a framework for
accommodation remains in question.
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1. This section draws on material first published in Simeon (2004).
This article tries to explore the capacity of Canadian federalism
to accommodate the dualist and regionalist character of Canada. Ca-
nadians debate several answers to this question.  For Quebec sover-
eignists, federalism is a strait-jacket that limits the ability of the nation
of Quebec to fully express itself on the domestic and international
stage: for them the Quebec ‘nation’ requires a Quebec ‘state.’ For
Quebec federalists, many of whom also see Quebec as a sociological
and political nation, its future lies in a continued membership in the
Canadian federation, but one which recognizes that Quebec is a ‘dis-
tinct society’ within Canada, that should be empowered with the abil-
ity to develop and promote the interests of the nation. For yet others,
the decentralist character of Canadian federalism, and the extensive
provisions for asymmetry built into the system, mean that Quebec is
already perhaps the most powerful sub-national government in the
world, such that it already has the powers necessary to fulfill its nation-
al destiny, within the federation. Opinion outside Quebec ranges from
those who accept this view, and embrace asymmetry, to those who
argue that Quebec is just one of ten existing provinces, each of which
is distinct, and which should be treated as equals within the constitu-
tional and political framework.
We begin by outlining the main political cleavages that have
run through Canada’s political system. We then explore some of the
key challenges that Canada’s federal system currently faces.
2. Federalism and Political Cleavages in Canada1
Language and region have historically been the dominant pol-
itical divisions in Canadian political life. The ways in which these iden-
tities have been articulated and mobilized have been shaped by the
federal institutional structure in which they exist, just as the terri-
torial character of these divisions has helped to shape the character
of Canadian federalism. The causal arrows run both ways. Language
and region ensured that the Canadian system would be federal; but
the design and operation of the federal system have had profound
effects on how language and region have played out in national pol-
itics.
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2.1. Language
When Britain sent its commissioner, Lord Durham, to investi-
gate conditions in the British North American colonies in 1838, he dis-
covered “two nations warring in the bosom of a single state.” His
solution to this state of affairs was to propose that English and French-
speaking Canada, then concentrated in the separate colonies of Upper
and Lower Canada, be merged into a single political entity, the United
Province of Canada. This would ensure, he believed, that over time
the Catholic, conservative French-speaking community would eventually
be assimilated into a British identity and British political institutions,
with “English laws and language . . . and a decidedly English legislature”
(McNaught, 1982: 94, 95).2 In 1849, the new United Province of Ca-
nada was established. Consistent with Durham’s assimilationist goals,
English was to be the language of the legislature, and each region
was to have equal representation, despite the fact that Lower Ca-
nada’s population was larger.
The result, however, was neither the assimilation nor the subor-
dination of the French-speaking community.  Instead the two commun-
ities rapidly established a regime remarkably akin to Lijphart’s con-
sociational democracy (Lijphart, 1984). Key to this development was
an alliance between leaders of a reform movement in both linguis-
tic communities who sought ‘responsible government,’ which would
require the appointed Governor to take instruction from elected Ca-
nadian ministers, rather than from the British Colonial Office. The al-
liance strengthened the idea that not only could Canada not be govern-
ed without the cooperation of French Canadians, but also that it could
be governed with them (McNaught, 1969: 99). There was equal repre-
sentation of Upper and Lower Canada in the legislature.3 Parties were
divided by language, but the governing coalitions were headed by
leaders of both language groups. French was restored as an official
language in 1848. Parallel ministries led by French and English-speaking
Ministers were established with largely separate administrations, often
2. The error, he argued, would be the “vain endeavor to preserve a French-Canadian
nationality in the midst of Anglo-American colonies and states”.
3. Which initially weakened the more numerous residents of (largely French speaking) Lo-
wer Canada.
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passing laws that applied only to one of the sections. Voting on key
legislation was by double majorities (Careless, 1967).
By the early 1860s, this consociational accommodation had broken
down. The rapid growth of English and Protestant Canada West led
to demands for “Representation by Population” fuelling Francophone
fear of dominance by an English-speaking majority. A series of div-
isions over issues such as sectarian education led to deadlock and par-
alysis (McNaught, 1969: 121). Both the strategy of integration through
assimilation advocated by Durham, and the consociational arrange-
ments worked out by the Canadian politicians had failed.
Federalism became an increasingly attractive way out of the im-
passe. It would do so in two ways: by ‘disengagement,’ allowing each
group to pursue its basic goals, without fear of veto by the other; and
by reducing the dangers of deadlock in a two-unit system, by bringing
into the federation the other British North American colonies - Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward island and Newfoundland to
the East, and British Columbia on the West Coast.4 Thus conflict over
language was one of the major (but by no means the only) forces
leading to the adoption of federalism in Canada. Its chief architects
were one leader from each group, Sir John A. Macdonald and Georges-
Etienne Cartier, working in close partnership. There is a remarkable
similarity between the Canadian experience between 1840 and the
establishment of the federal regime in 1867 and the experience of
Belgium in more recent times. In both cases linguistic accommodation
within a single government failed as the aspirations of the constitu-
ent groups increasingly diverged, and in both the solution was to
move to a more territorial division of power.
Language was also a major reason why the federalism that de-
veloped was a relatively decentralized one. Macdonald’s vision for
federalism, reflected in the British North America Act, 1867,5 hoped
to establish a dominant central government, with the provinces even-
tually withering to little more than municipal status. Federal control
of the then most important policy areas, its fiscal superiority, and a
variety of other levers (Wheare, 1946: 19-20) placed the provinces in
4. Although only Nova Scotia and New Brunswick joined in 1867.
5. Now renamed the Constitution Act, 1867.
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an almost colonial position vis à vis the central government. But if
Canada was federal largely because of the presence of Quebec, that
same force was a major reason why the federation moved in a decen-
tralizing direction. By the 1880s, Quebec, along with Ontario, was
pushing successfully for limits on federal power and increased auto-
nomy for the provinces. For Quebec, the primary issue was the power
to preserve its own language and culture in the face of an English-
speaking majority at the national level. For Ontario at this time, the
issue was not language, but a combination of partisan differences and
a struggle among rival economic elites over free trade versus protec-
tionism in relations with the United States. Together they elaborated
the more confederal “compact theory” of Canadian federalism, seeing
the national government as the creature of the provinces. But even
if Canada were to be seen in this way, the question has persisted: is
it to be a compact between two language groups, or ten provinces?
Confederation was also a nation-building exercise aimed at cre-
ating a Canada ‘from sea to sea,’ and gradually the federation was
extended westward to the Pacific. This creation of new provinces had
an important effect on the development of French Canadian and
Quebec identity. First, it reduced the overall weight of Quebec in the
federation: from one of four provinces at the outset, it eventually be-
came one province in ten. Second, the new western provincial govern-
ments proved hostile to French-Canadian interests. The legislation
establishing the provinces of Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan
included protections for their French-speaking minorities, including
minority language education rights, the translation of provincial
statutes and the right to use either official language in the courts.
These provisions were systematically ignored by the new legislatures.6
Ontario as well placed limits on French-language schools in the province.
These developments had the effect of keeping French Canadians within
the confines of Quebec (see table 1 on provincial language groups).
This in turn helped reshape Francophone identities, from the
original canadiens, the first white settlers of what is now Canada, to
French-Canadians, defined primarily by language and religion, and
eventually to the contemporary Québécois, a national identity cen-
6. Not until 1985 did the Supreme Court of Canada declare that Manitoba must fulfill the
obligations of the Manitoba Act by translating all its statutes into French.
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tered on the Quebec state. With the exception of parts of Ontario
near the Quebec border, and a large part of New Brunswick, French
speakers were concentrated in Quebec, where today they make up
just over 80 per cent of the population. French-speaking Canadians
constitute small, and rapidly assimilating, proportions of the popula-
tion in most other provinces. Thus, despite constitutional protections
of minority language rights, the autonomy conferred by federalism
not only had the effect of opening an institutional space from which
Francophones could pursue self-government within the province of
Quebec, but also provided the space for other provinces to limit the
use of the French language. Hence the French English cleavage is in
Canada today expressed almost entirely as a Canada-Quebec conflict,
a conflict between two ‘nations’ (Richards, 1999: 84-143). That it came
to take this form is a powerful institutional consequence of federalism.
2.2. Region
Regional differences constitute the second set of cleavages that
have dominated Canadian politics since its inception. Here too, there
Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 census. Allophone refers to the population with a non-
official language as mother tongue. It is mainly composed of immigrants and the aboriginal
population.
Table 1: Language Groups, Canada, provinces, territories, 2001
Anglophone Francophone Allophone
Newfoundland and Labrador 98.4 0.5 1.1
Prince Edward Island 94.0 4.4 1.6
Nova Scotia 93.0 3.9 3.1
New Brunswick 65.0 33.2 1.7
Quebec 8.3 81.4 10.3
Ontario 71.3 4.5 24.2
Manitoba 75.4 4.2 20.5
Saskatchewan 85.4 1.9 12.7
Alberta 81.5 2.1 16.4
British Columbia 73.6 1.5 24.8
Yukon Territory 86.8 3.3 9.9
Northwest Territories 77.8 2.7 19.5
Nunavut 26.9 1.5 71.6
Canada 59.1 22.9 18.0
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7. See Roger Gibbins (1982). The argument is that regionalism is no greater in Canada
than the U.S.; the difference is that it is more institutionalized in Canada. See also David
J. Elkins and Richard Simeon (1980).
are important historical, cultural and economic differences that sus-
tain regional identities and regional politics. The Canadian federation
was formed from a number of pre-existing British North American
colonies. Regional identities have remained strong, as have regional
differences in wealth and the structure of regional economies. Indeed,
there is some evidence that globalization and North American econ-
omic integration is weakening the economic linkages that tie the
Canadian regions together (Courchene and Telmer, 1998). Here too,
federalism is not only a response to regional difference, but also in-
stitutionalizes and perpetuates it. Regionalism in Canada, while often
expressed in parties of regional protest in national politics, is most
often expressed in Canada as provincialism. Regional interests are de-
fined and articulated by provincial governments using the institutio-
nal resources provided by federalism. To some degree, these govern-
ments have a vested interest in the maintenance of the perception of
regional difference. Federalism also means that regional conflicts tend
to be played out in the arena of competitive intergovernmental rela-
tions. Moreover, the institutionalization of region through provincial
governments creates an image of homogeneity within regions, while
blurring both their internal heterogeneity (especially in large, diverse
provinces like Ontario), and the growing convergence among regions
in terms of social structures, attitudinal patterns, and the like.7
Indeed recent surveys suggest the on most important policy is-
sues facing Canada, regional differences are small, and declining. This
is also true for the attitudes of Québécois and non-Québécois. There
is also considerable evidence that Canadians in all provinces, including
Quebec, positively identify both with the national and provincial pol-
itical communities. In a recent survey, 81 per cent of Canadians out-
side Quebec felt ‘profoundly attached’ to Canada; 59 per cent felt the
same way about their province. Here, however, there are differences:
Québécois tend to give primacy to their Quebec identification. Forty
per cent of Québécois feel profoundly attached to Canada; 52 per
cent to Quebec (CRIC 2000: 14-16). Among Francophones in Quebec,
29 per cent identify themselves as solely a Québécois; 29 per cent as
a Quebecer first, then a Canadian; 24 per cent as equally Québécois
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and Canadian; 12 per cent as first a Canadian, then a Quebecer; and
five per cent as simply Canadian (Mackie: 2001).
Residents of the largest province, Ontario, tend to give primacy
to their identification with a national government in which they exer-
cise such great political weight; westerners tend to value both ident-
ifications equally, but often perceive themselves as excluded from
power at the center. Citizens in the poorer Atlantic Canada have simi-
lar views, tempered in their case by the recognition that their well-
being continues to depend heavily on financial support from Ottawa
(Beauchamp, Dugas, and Graves, 1999: 307-354). It is perhaps interest-
ing to note that Canadians are more likely to state that their primary
sense of belonging is to the country, rather than province or locality,
than are Americans (Beauchamp, Dugas and Graves, 1999: 314). Again,
it is the distinctive pattern of Canadian federalism that gives regional-
ism such prominence in national debates.
Nevertheless, strong regional grievances persist. For example, in
a survey conducted in 2000, respondents were asked whether or not
their province has its fair share in making important national decisions
and whether their province is treated with the respect it deserves. In
eight provinces (all but Quebec and Ontario), majorities ranging from
54 to 74 per cent said their province has less than its fair share of in-
fluence; and majorities from 50 per cent in Manitoba to 76 per cent
in Newfoundland said they were not treated with sufficient respect.
(CRIC 2002: 19). The salience of regional grievances varies over time
and according to the dominant public issues of the day. In the post-
war period, when the national ‘project’ was the federally led cons-
truction of the welfare state, regional concerns were muted. The issues
surrounding the welfare state were more likely to divide Canadians
along class than regional lines. In the 1970s, when the energy crisis
sharply divided Canadians on regional lines, pitting producers against
consumers, and Ottawa versus the producing provinces with respect
to prices and revenues, regional identities took center stage. The
ensuing battles paved the way for the emergence of the latest and
strongest western regional party, the Reform party, which in 1999
renamed itself the Canadian Alliance, before merging in 2003 with
the Progressive Conservative Party to create the Conservative Party,
which is currently in power.
   Federalism thus appears to accentuate regional differences, while
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acting as a barrier to the emergence of political cleavages based on
alternative dimensions of difference. It is one reason why class divi-
sions have been less salient in Canada than in other advanced indus-
trial countries. However, in recent years a number of newer divisions
have emerged to challenge the dominance of territory in Canadian
politics and its constitutional discourse.
These include Aboriginal peoples seeking self-government. Their
call for a ‘Third Order’ of Aboriginal government is strongly informed
by the logic of federalism, but their image of Canada is for obvious
reasons deeply opposed to any conception of Canada as a partnership
between ‘two founding peoples,’ English and French. Like Quebec,
many aboriginal leaders seek to relate to Canada on a “nation” to
“nation” basis (Cairns, 2000, Tully, 1999: 413-442, Abele, 1999: 443-
462). Second is the increased ethnic diversity of Canada, leading to
the embrace of ‘multiculturalism’ in legislation and in the Constitu-
tion. This too challenges the ‘two founding peoples’ image with the
image of many constituent groups. It is sometimes seen as a threat by
Francophones, who fear being relegated to the status of ‘just another
ethnic group.’ Finally, the emergence of social movements, such as
feminist groups and others, empowered by the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms adopted in 1982, challenged the legitimacy of a constitu-
tional agenda dominated by issues of territory and language. They
also contested a constitutional process that was monopolized by the
institutions of executive federalism.
Thus social change in the rest of Canada has led the rest of Ca-
nada to become less willing to view Canada as a binational or dualist
system. Quebec increasingly has come to be seen as just one element
of Canadian diversity; and increasingly it seemed to be fainter on the
national radar screen then newer manifestations of diversity. Moreover,
changes since the 1960s have significantly reduced the disparities in
economic and political power between French and English-speaking
Canadians that had been thoroughly documented as recently as the
1960s by a federal Royal Commission (Canada 1969). This improve-
ment – the result of both provincial and federal policies – has under-
mined the perception of Québécois as a group with legitimate griev-
ances that should be redressed.
These multiple cleavages, as they interact with federalism, are
closely related to a set of competing images of the Canadian polity
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that have dominated recent constitutional debates. Language leads
to a sense of Canada as a dualist, bi-communal, or bi-national entity,
and focuses attention on accommodations that will recognize a dis-
tinct status for Quebec in an asymmetrical federal system. That is in
tension with a provincialist conception of Canada, seeing it as com-
posed of ten equal provinces, each distinctive in its own way. This
image focuses attention on constitutional symmetry, and on Canadian
governance as a collaboration or partnership between federal and
provincial governments. Both of these are in tension with the Abori-
ginal vision of Canada as a partnership between Europeans and the
‘First nations,’ leading to the idea of Aboriginal self-government as
a third order of government alongside national and provincial govern-
ments. And all of these are in tension with the liberal vision of Canada
as made up of 30 million equal citizens, a conception strongly rein-
forced by the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982.
The central constitutional challenge for Canada in recent years has
been to find a way to reconcile these “three equalities” – of nations,
provinces, and citizens (Cairns, 1991). Or, put it slightly differently
between an Ottawa-centered, a province-centered, and a Quebec
centered vision of the federal system.
3. Current Challenges
3.1. The Quebec Question
Few would dispute that historically federalism has been an im-
portant – though not the only – institutional device for managing
linguistic and regional conflicts. Yet, over the last forty years, many
Quebec nationalists have rejected federalism and struggled to achieve
an independent, sovereign Quebec state. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, in October 1995, they came within a few thousand votes of
winning a referendum calling for the secession of Quebec, with a con-
tinuing economic and political “partnership” with the rest of Canada.
In a closely disputed referendum, with a very high turnout (94%),
49.4% of the Quebec population supported the independence op-
tion, while 50.6% voted against it. Such close result (a difference of
less than 50,000 votes) sent a shockwave throughout Canada.
The reaction of the federal government following the Quebec
referendum fell into two categories, labeled Plan A or Plan B, or the
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carrot and the stick. Plan A represents the continuing search for ac-
commodation within the federal system. Its prospects have been limi-
ted both by the bitter experience of years of failed constitutional ne-
gotiations, and by the continued antipathy to ‘constitutional’ asym-
metrical solutions with respect to Quebec. The search in recent years
has therefore been for options that do not involve constitutional
change. For example, in 1997, all the provincial governments agreed
on “The Calgary Declaration,” a broad statement of principles, in-
cluding the statement that “In Canada’s federal system, where res-
pect for diversity and equality underlies unity, the unique character
of Quebec society, including its French-speaking majority, its culture
and its tradition of civil law, is fundamental to the well-being of Ca-
nada. Consequently the legislature and government of Quebec have
a role to protect and develop the unique character of Quebec society
in Canada.” The Declaration was ratified as a resolution in most legis-
latures, but it was a much watered down expression of Quebec’s dis-
tinctness from the (failed) constitutional proposals in the 1980s and
early 1990s. It had little impact in Quebec. In addition, the federal
parliament passed a resolution promising that it would not agree to
any future amendments without the support of Quebec. It too had
little impact, and was not binding on any future legislature. Most
Québécois continue to place a high value on constitutional recogni-
tion of its unique character; few Canadians outside Quebec consider
this a priority (CRIC 2001: 20).
The more substantial element of Plan A has been to demons-
trate to Québécois and others that federalism ‘works,’ that it allows
for considerable freedom for provinces to pursue their own priorities
and to manage their interdependence through intergovernmental
cooperation. For example, Quebec now plays a distinct role with re-
spect to labour force training, while it is not bound like other prov-
inces to a Health Accord signed in 2004 in order to increase provincial
accountability. Such informal departures from symmetry seem to gen-
erate less hostility outside Quebec than more symbolic, institutional-
ized, or constitutionalized forms, which tend to be perceived as
breaching the ‘equality of provinces’ dogma.
Plan B has attracted the most attention. It is a set of strategies
designed to convince Québécois that secession would be messy, com-
plex, costly, and very difficult to achieve, and that it is quite wrong
for them to believe that life would go on as before. It is also design-
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8. References re Secession of Quebec. (1998) 2 SCR.
ed to demonstrate that Quebec has no unilateral right to secession,
and that it can have no expectation that the Rest of Canada would
be prepared to negotiate a ‘partnership’ in the aftermath of a se-
cession. This would be a matter for the Rest of Canada to decide, in
light of the question asked and the majority received. Finally, Plan B
tells Québécois that among the many items on any negotiating table
would be the very borders of Quebec itself. If plan A options are the
carrot designed to win Québécois over to federalism, Plan B is the
stick to make secession appear undesirable and infeasible (Cameron:
1999).
The first major step to implement B was a reference by the fed-
eral government to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1996. It asked
whether Quebec has a right to unilateral secession either under ex-
isting Canadian law, or under international law; and if these differ
which should prevail.
The court determined quickly that neither Canadian nor inter-
national law suggest such a right.8 The Canadian constitution, said the
court, is silent on the matter; and Quebec does not fall under the cat-
egory of oppressed or colonial peoples that would justify self-deter-
mination under international law. A secession in Canada, the court
concluded, would be a constitutional change of profound import-
ance; it could only be achieved in accordance with the Canadian consti-
tution, and within the rule of law. The court also asserted a set of
broad principles that underpin the Canadian constitution, and that
would have to be respected in any secession exercise. These include:
constitutionalism and the rule of law, federalism, democracy, and re-
spect for minorities. But, having rejected the legality of unilateral se-
cession, the court went on to level the playing field. It said that if
Québécois were to vote for secession according to a ‘clear question’
and a ‘clear majority,’ then other Canadian political actors would have
a constitutional obligation to negotiate the matter, taking into ac-
count the fundamental principles and the questions that would be on
the table – including debts, borders, and the like. Canada was divis-
ible. The judgment was initially embraced enthusiastically by both
sides. But crucial questions remained. What constitutes a clear ques-
tion, and who is to decide the matter? And what is a clear majority?
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In the fall of 1999, following a battle of press releases and let-
ters, the federal government sought to answer such questions by tab-
ling Bill C-20, ‘An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as
set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec
Secession Reference.’
The Bill acknowledged in the preamble that any province is free
to put any question to its people. But at the same time it asserted that
“the House of Commons as the only political institution elected to re-
present all Canadians has an important role in identifying what con-
stitutes a clear question and a clear majority sufficient for the Govern-
ment of Canada to enter into negotiations in relation to the secession
of a province from Canada.” The Act then specified that within 30
days after its promulgation, the Canadian parliament will determine
whether or not the question is clear (S. 1). S. 4 declares that any ques-
tion that asked merely for a “mandate” to negotiate rather than a
direct intention to separate is to be deemed unclear. So is any ques-
tion that ties the idea of secession to continued economic or political
arrangements with Canada. If the proposed question does not meet
these tests then the government of Canada would not enter any ne-
gotiations on secession.
The Act also states that the government will only enter nego-
tiations if it is satisfied that there has been “a clear expression of a
will by a clear majority of the population,” of the seceding province.
Nonetheless, it does not set out how high the bar should be. Instead,
the House should take into account the size of the majority achieved,
the percentage of the electorate that had voted, and ‘any other’ re-
levant circumstances (S 2.2).
Finally, the Act states that no constitutional amendment bring-
ing about secession can be considered unless it has addressed the
terms of secession, including “the division of assets and liabilities, any
changes in the borders of the province, the rights, interests and terri-
torial claims of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and the protection
of minority rights” (S. 3).
The Quebec reaction was to call the federal Bill an offence to
the “democratic values all Québécois hold dearest.” It denies the basic
right of “Québécois and Québécois alone, to determine the choice
between sovereignty or a reformed federalism that respects Quebec
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identity. “We subscribe, of course, to the obligation of clarity, but we
maintain it is a responsibility that only the (Quebec) National Assem-
bly can and must assume” (Government of Quebec, 1999). The gov-
ernment retaliated with its own legislation, asserting the right of
Québécois alone to decide their future, the sanctity of the 50 per cent
plus one majority principle, the inviolability of Quebec’s current boun-
daries, and Quebec’s respect for diversity.
Thus positions about the basic rules that might determine Ca-
nada’s future remains starkly polarized. The irony is that to avoid
chaos and uncertainty in the event that there were a “yes” vote to
sovereignty, both sides have an enormous interest in prior agreement
on the rules, and the consequences that would flow from different
outcomes. The politics of the situation, however, render such agreement
impossible.
Finally, another element of the federal government strategy was
to increase the visibility of the federal government in Quebec, partly
through a “sponsorship” program that would display the Canadian
flag and publicize the federal role at cultural and sporting events
around the province. Yet, this program to ‘market’ Canada to Québéc-
ois would lead to one of the biggest political scandals of the history
of the country when it was found that political operatives close to the
ruling Liberal government had used these funds fraudulently. The
public anger led to a significant increase in support for sovereignty
in Quebec (led by the federalist Quebec’s Liberal Party since 2003) and
the defeat of the Federal Liberal Party in the recent 2006 election
(which was won by the Conservative Party, although with a minority
of seats) (see table 2 for the current standing of parties in the federal
parliament). The idea that loyalty to Canada could be ‘bought’ was
deeply offensive to most Québécois.
Meanwhile, since 1995, the Quebec government has developed
new legislation and social programs that have reinforced Quebec’s
distinctiveness in Canada. Within Canada, Quebec has managed to
develop a distinct citizenship regime (Papillon and Turgeon, 2003).
The sovereignist Parti Québécois from 1994 to 2003, despite fiscal aus-
terity, adopted a set of new social policies that turned out to be ex-
tremely popular, among them a universal childcare system unique in
North America. The Parti Québécois was defeated in the 2003 elec-
tion and replaced by the federalist and slightly more conservative
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Parti Libéral which has maintained the innovative social policies adopt-
ed by the previous government. Québécois leaders continue to play
an important role in federal politics. Quebec politicians (both at the
federal and provincial level), Quebec’s civil society organizations, and
more generally Quebec’s citizens have heavily lobbied the federal go-
vernment to adopt some of its more progressive legislation, includ-
ing the recognition of same-sex marriage and the ratification of the
Kyoto Accord, while pressuring it to stay out of Iraq.
At the beginning of 2006, the prospect of a successful third ref-
erendum on Quebec sovereignty seemed more realistic than ever,
considering the sponsorship scandal and the declining public support
for the current (federalist) Quebec government. There is indeed a
significant chance than the nationalist Parti Québécois will win the
next provincial election and hold yet another referendum if it regains
power.
But there are no simple predictions. The Conservative Party, now
in power at the central level, embraces values that are often perceiv-
ed as hostile to the dominant social-democratic ethos of Quebec and
the socially liberal values of its population. But is also espousing an
‘open federalism’ more open to provincial diversity, a solution to a
perceived ‘fiscal imbalance’ favourable to Quebec, and a plan to per-
mit the representation of Quebec in international forums, such as
*The Bloc Québécois is a party promoting the independence of Quebec
Table 2: Current standing of parties in the House of Commons
Canada
(including Quebec) Quebec
Conservative Party 125 10
Liberal Party of Canada 102 13
Bloc Québécois* 51 51
New Democratic Party 29 0
Independent 1 1
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9. The federal government in Canada is said to possess a “spending power” allowing him
to intervene in provincial jurisdiction. Although such power has historically been denoun-
UNESCO. The ‘perfect storm’ for federalists in the federal and provincial
elections expected in the next two years would be the election of a
PQ government at the provincial level, combined with a sweep of
Quebec seats by the Bloc Québécois. This could well produce what
some Quebec leaders have called the ‘winning conditions’ for another
referendum. The ‘perfect storm’ for sovereignists would be the re-
election of the federalist Liberals in Quebec, and even more seats for
the federal Conservatives in the Canadian election. This would rein-
force the position of a group of Quebec nationalists, who have argued
that the moment for a successful project for sovereignty in the current
generation has passed. It is far too early to predict which outcome is
more likely.
  Yet, it is also doubtful that the country will be able to entrench
into the Canadian constitution the sort of recognition of its national
character that Catalonia was recently granted and which has been at
the heart of Quebec’s demands since the 1960s. The paradox remains
the same: Canada’s federal system has provided Quebec with some of
the most extensive fiscal and legislative powers of any non-indepen-
dent small nations. Yet, in contrast to Spain or the United Kingdom,
Canada has been incapable of recognizing its own multinational char-
acter in the words and symbols of the constitution.
3.2. Re-Tooling Intergovernmental Relations
The 1990s was in Canada a period of significant fiscal austerity.
There were major cuts in social spending as the federal government
reduced its fiscal transfers to the provinces and withdrew from impor-
tant sectors of public policy. (Provinces did much the same thing as
they downloaded to their municipalities). These cuts generated much
provincial criticism. But by the end of the decade the situation was
reversed. Now the federal government was accumulating large sur-
pluses (while provinces still struggled financially). In a series of agree-
ments, many of the cuts in areas like health care were restored. But
another source of conflict emerged: now Ottawa was strongly tempt-
ed to use its surplus to re-engage in social policy.9
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Such growing interventions in sectors such as postsecondary
education, municipal infrastructures and childcare were perceived in
Quebec as the return of a nation-building role for the federal govern-
ment, despite Quebec’s long-standing objections (Boismenu, Dufour,
Saint-Martin, 2004: 147-56). Some analysts announced the arrival of
a federal ‘social investment’ state (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003),
whose objective would be to combine social justice, economic devel-
opment and urban renewal, intervening massively in provincial juris-
dictions (a project that could have considerable resonance in Canada
outside Quebec). Indeed, in the late 1990s, the federal government
introduced a series of new programs such research chairs for Canadian
universities, housing supports for the homeless and “green infrastruc-
ture funds” for municipalities. On the other hand, the decrease in
federal transfers and the major increase of health care costs due to
an aging population have significantly limited provinces’ capacity to
fulfill their constitutionally assigned responsibilities and their flexibi-
lity to develop new programs to address emerging social and econ-
omic issues.
These new federal programs in areas of provincial responsibil-
ity, combined with the precarious fiscal situation of most provinces
save for the oil-rich province of Alberta, led first to growing attempts
by the provinces to present a unified discourse vis-à-vis the federal
government, and secondly to the growing importance of fiscal issues
as an increasingly divisive dimension in Canadian intergovernmental
relations (see next section).
It must be stressed that among federations, Canada has one of
the least institutionalized system of intergovernmental relations. At
the center are meetings and conferences of ‘First Ministers,’ (FMM’s
and FMC’s). There are a number of ‘Ministerial Councils,’ focused on
different areas of public policy in which both levels are engaged. Min-
isterial meetings are backed up by a myriad of meetings among of-
ficials. Increasingly, these discussions result in intergovernmental agree-
ments and accords, setting out common principles, reporting rela-
tionships, and sometimes specific financial arrangements. But there
is no regular schedule for first ministers meetings; there are no formal
ced by some provinces, especially Quebec, its existence has been confirmed by the Supre-
me Court of Canada.
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10. Towards the end of its tenure the Liberal government, defeated in 2006, negotiated
a complex and detailed series of agreements on child care with all the provinces. But fol-
lowing the election the new government cancelled them. Similarly, the out-going govern-
ment had negotiated an historic agreement between Ottawa, the provinces and leaders
of Canada’s major Aboriginal organizations designed to ‘close the gap’ between the ma-
jority population and its Aboriginal peoples. Again, the new government did not feel it-
self bound by the agreement.
decision-making mechanisms; there is no dedicated bureaucracy ser-
ving the intergovernmental process; and intergovernmental agree-
ments have no legal or constitutional status, and hence few provi-
sions for enforcement or dispute resolution. Nor are they binding on
future governments.10
Three factors explained this lack of institutionalization. First, the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty means that intergovernment-
al accords cannot be binding without the consent of the provincial
and federal legislatures. Governments are responsible to their own
legislatures and voters, not to each other. Second, the great diversity
of provinces and their resulting differences in interests and priorities
strongly inhibits their capacity for collective decision-making. Finally,
the absence of a provincial voice within the federal apparatus, such
as in the case of Lander representation in the German Bundesrat, to-
gether with a highly regionalized party system, means that the fed-
eral arena itself is ill-equipped to reconcile and accommodate the
competing interests, throwing a heavy burden of negotiation on the
executive processes of intergovernmental relations.
The willingness of the federalist government of Quebec to dem-
onstrate the efficient working of the federation and the growing
desire of provinces to present a united front in negotiation with the
federal government led to the creation in 2003 of a new institutional
setting for intergovernmental relations in Canada: the Council of the
Federation. The Council is a body made up only of the Premiers of
Canada’s provinces; it does not include the federal Prime Minister.
According to its Founding Agreement, the Council is to strengthen
provincial-territorial cooperation, ‘provide an integrated co-ordinated
approach to federal-provincial relations,’ assess federal actions with
a major impact on the provinces, and ‘develop a common vision of
how intergovernmental relations should be conducted in keeping
with the fundamental values and principles of federalism,’ and work
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with ‘the greatest respect for transparency and better communica-
tion with Canadians.’ (Founding Agreement, 2-3.) Decisions are to be
reached by ‘consensus.’
Whether the Council will become a more central feature of the
intergovernmental landscape is not yet known. Much will depend on
the Council’s ability to reconcile differences among its hugely diverse
membership – large and small, rich and poor, east, west and north.
Much will also depend on provinces avoiding the temptation to strike
individual agreements with Ottawa when it is to their advantage,
rather than acting as a group. So far, there is little evidence that prov-
inces are willing to temper that individual interests in favour of inter-
provincial consensus.  In June, 2006 the limits of the Council were dra-
matically illustrated as provinces failed to agree on a common solution
to the ‘fiscal imbalance’ (Simeon, 2006: 326).
The most expansive possible interpretation of the role of the
Council is that it hints at a more ‘confederal’ Canada, one in which
provinces and territories make collective national decisions, at least
in those broad areas lying primarily in provincial jurisdiction. This is
underlined by the absence of Ottawa from the Council. Alternatively,
and more likely, it could be little more than a minor formalization of
existing provincial-territorial institutions.
Another interesting development in Canada’s intergovernment-
al affairs has been the growing assertiveness of Canadian municipal-
ities (Turgeon, forthcoming 2006). Historically in Canada, cities have
had very limited political powers, since they are, according to the
Constitution, creatures of the provinces. They can unilaterally modify
the charters, boundaries, resources and responsibilities of cities. Yet,
over the past decade, Canadian cities, especially major cities such as
Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, Winnipeg and Calgary, have increas-
ingly demanded a fair share of Canada’s fiscal revenue so that they
can ensure their competitiveness in relation to other world cities in
an era of globalization, and equip themselves better to integrate im-
migrants, who are heavily concentrated in a few large metropolitan
areas. Although their campaign has achieved some initial success, in
the form of some modest fiscal transfers from the federal government,
it quickly became overshadowed by increasingly bitter debates on the
horizontal fiscal imbalance between provinces and the vertical fiscal
imbalance between the provinces and the federal government.
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11. With the exception of ‘indirect taxes’ for the provinces.
12. Equalization payments, of which Quebec is the largest single recipient, primarily by
virtue of is large population compared with other poorer provinces, have no conditions
attached.
3.3. Federalism and Fiscal Imbalance
After Switzerland, it is often said, Canada is the most decentral-
ized federation in the world. This is especially the case with regard to
fiscal matters. The federal share of total government spending is  37
per cent – compared with 61 per cent in the United Sates,53 per cent
in Australia, and 41 per cent in Germany. Each level of government
has a high degree of autonomy in raising and spending revenues.
Each is constitutionally entitled to occupy all major tax fields.11 Each
is free to borrow on domestic and international markets. There are
considerable financial transfers between federal and provincial gov-
ernments, but these are remarkable for their largely unconditional
nature, especially when compared with other federations, such as the
US, Germany and Australia.
 The largest single transfer is ‘equalization,’ designed, as S. 36 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 puts it, to ensure through unconditional
federal payments that all provinces have the ability to provide ‘com-
parable’ levels of public service at ‘comparable’ levels of taxation.12
Other transfers for health, post-secondary education and other mat-
ters have only very broad and general conditions attached. Transfers
from Ottawa to the provinces represent only 13 per cent of provin-
cial spending (though this varies considerably between richer and
poorer provinces), compared with 31 per cent in the United States,
and 41 per cent in Australia. (Simeon and Papillon, 2006: 103-6) Thus,
since the high water mark of federal fiscal dominance in the 1950s,
the trend – often led by Quebec – has been towards fiscal decentral-
ization, both in terms of provincial revenues and spending, and in
terms of fewer and weaker ‘conditions’ linked to the federal trans-
fers that remain.
Nonetheless, there is a growing debate in Canada about an al-
leged ‘fiscal imbalance’ in Canadian fiscal federalism. Again, the debate
was initiated by Quebec, when the Séguin Commission appointed by
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the Quebec government reported.13 The debate suggests a fundament-
al mismatch between the policy responsibilities assigned to provinces
(which include most of the growing areas of public expenditure) and
the resources that are available to them. The alleged mismatch has
two dimensions. The ‘vertical’ imbalance suggests that the central
government has revenues that exceed their needs, thus producing
large surpluses, and providing an incentive to spend in areas of prov-
incial jurisdiction, while the provinces collectively are running fiscal
deficits. Ottawa has said this is illusory: there are no constitutional
barriers to provinces’ raising their taxes to meet their needs. Provin-
ces, on the other hand, have pointed out their inability to sustain the
increasing level of spending in health and education and to balance
their budgets. Two sets of solutions have been proposed: to shift ad-
ditional taxing powers to the provinces (as happened in the 1960s and
1970s), or to increase federal transfers to the provinces in areas such
as post-secondary education.
The ‘horizontal’ fiscal imbalance refers to the large economic
disparities among Canadian provinces. The Canadian solution to this
has been ‘equalization. The principle is clear, and fundamental to the
idea of Canada as a ‘sharing community.’ The concept has deep sup-
port in all sections of Canada, seen as a central part of the ‘federal
bargain’. But it has recently come under considerable strain. Partly
this is because one province, energy rich Alberta, has per capita rev-
enues that greatly now exceed those of any other province. To ‘equal-
ize’ provincial revenues to the level of Alberta (the 10-province stan-
dard) and to take full account of energy revenues would, as the pro-
gram is designed, massively increase federal spending, much of it
funded by Ontario taxpayers who do not themselves benefit from
resource revenues.14 Ontario, joined by Alberta has vigorously resist-
ed increasing the amounts devoted to equalization. This puts it in
13. Quebec. Commission sur le déséquilibre fiscal, Pour un nouveau partage des moyens
financiers au Canada. Rapport final. At www.desequilibrefiscal.gouv.qc.ca. For the fede-
ral response, see Government of Canada, Department of Finance, “The Fiscal Balance in
Canada,” October, 2004. www.fin.ca/facts/fbcfacts9_e.html.
14. Two reports, reaching slightly different conclusions, make recommendations for re-
form of equalization. Finance Canada, Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial Formu-
la Financing, Achieving a National Purpose: Putting Equalization Back on Track, (Ottawa:
2006), www.eqtff-pfft.ca. Council of the Federation, Advisory Panel on Fiscal Imbalance,
Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Addressing Canada’s Fiscal Imbalance, Ottawa, 2006.
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conflict with Quebec, which is the largest single recipient of equal-
ization payments.15
While fiscal federalism is not a constitutional issue, it has be-
come a central concern of the politics of Canadian federalism. Funda-
mental issues of public policy – childcare, health care, the environ-
ment, global warming – frequently become subordinated to wrang-
ling over funding. In 2006, Quebec placed the fiscal imbalance at the
centre of the Canadian debate. A newly elected Conservative minor-
ity government in Ottawa, anxious to build future support in the prov-
ince, has embraced this concept. The result is that the fiscal debate is
no longer just about economics and efficiency, but also about Que-
bec’s perceptions of Canadian federalism and its flexibility towards its
demands; and about the broader commitment to sharing and redis-
tribution in an increasingly competitive economic environment.
4. Conclusion: Federal-Provincial Diplomacy
All Over Again?
In 1972, one of the authors of this article published a book en-
titled Federal-Provincial Diplomacy (Simeon, 1972, 2006). The book
examined intergovernmental relations in the 1960s, a decade marked
by major new social and economic programs introduced by the fed-
eral government, and by assertive provinces eager to defend their
interests and their jurisdictional turf. The author compared the round
of intergovernmental relations in that period to international nego-
tiations, in which provinces and Ottawa relentlessly pursue their self-
interest during intergovernmental conferences.
This was also the period during which the modernizing ‘Quiet
Revolution’ was occurring in Quebec. No longer did Quebec reject the
secular, social-democratic state. Instead, Quebec embraced it. But now
it was to be achieved largely through the Quebec state, rather than
through federal imposition. As a result, in that decade, Quebec not
only strongly resisted new federal ‘intrusions,’ but also asserted its
own jurisdiction, its desire to be treated differently from other prov-
15. While other poorer provinces receive much higher per capita payments than does Que-
bec, its population means that the total is much greater.
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vinces, and its need for fundamental change in fiscal federalism. Much
of this agenda was achieved: the provincial share of major taxes dra-
matically increased; Quebec established its own pension plan, paral-
lel to a national plan for the rest of the country; Quebec established
agreements with Ottawa to give it a greater voice over immigration;
and Quebec was able to ‘opt-out’ of a number of federal shared cost
programs. In this period, as well, the constitutional issue emerged,
and it was to dominate intergovernmental relations until the 1990s.
This period ended with the accession to power in Ottawa of
Pierre Trudeau, who was deeply hostile to a ‘two-nation’ view of
Canada, and who believed that further concessions to Quebec – es-
pecially formal recognition of its ‘special’ or ‘distinct’ status as the pri-
mary government of the people of Quebec – would set the stage for
a slippery slope towards secession, in which Québécois’ ties to Otta-
wa and the rest of the country would steadily diminish. His solution
was equal treatment of the provinces; and the promotion of bilingual-
ism across the country, and especially within the central government,
though ‘official bilingualism.’ Trudeau was able to achieve some of
his most important goals – notably a pan-Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, enforced by a national institution, the Supreme Court.
But Quebec’s gains of the 1960s were retained, and in a few cases ex-
tended, and the decentralist trend initiated in the 1960s has generally
continued.
Indeed, the dynamics of Canadian intergovernmental relations
in the 21st century would find many more similarities than differences
should they be compared with the 1960s. This is so, despite dramatic
changes in Canadian society and culture, the growth of globalization,
and decades of constitutional debate. It is a remarkable testimony to
the inertia of institutional arrangements.
Many of the familiar issues remain: finding a stable and mutual-
ly acceptable place for Quebec in the federation; addressing the needs
of the cities; clarifying the roles and responsibilities of governments
and ensuring that fiscal arrangements are appropriately synchronized
with the respective responsibilities of each level of government; find-
ing a more productive pattern of intergovernmental relations that
reduces the current emphasis on ‘turf protection’, status, power, credit-
claiming and blame avoidance and permits more creative focus on
substantive policy issues and more citizen involvement; finding ways
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to incorporate cities and indigenous Aboriginal governments more
fully into the multilevel intergovernmental system. Thus, over time,
the issues change; but the mechanisms Canadians have to deal with
them lag far behind.
From the perspective of Quebec nationalists (whether federal-
ist or secessionist), the story of Canadian federalism remains ambigu-
ous. From one point of view, it is a story of failure. There has been
no formal recognition of Quebec’s distinctiveness, or of asymmetry in
the constitution. Quebec has had to continue to battle against per-
ceived federal ‘intrusions’ into provincial jurisdiction. Two referenda
on secession have been defeated, albeit very narrowly in 1995. While
support for secession (at least so long as it is accompanied by a conti-
nued economic association with the rest of Canada) remains strong,
some of the passion behind the movement has faded as some Qué-
bécois, much like Canadians outside of Quebec, have come to dread
constitutional discussions.
But there is another, much more positive, story. In some funda-
mental ways the ‘Quebec nation-building’ project has succeeded with-
in the Canadian federation. Quebec has developed a strong, vibrant,
self-confident civil society, which exists remarkably independent from
Canada more generally; Quebec has been able to develop a distinct-
ive approach to social policy that is in some ways quite distinct from
that of other provinces. Quebec retains great influence at the federal
level (Québécois have occupied the post of Prime Minister with only
very minor interruptions since the 1950s); the economic and political
disadvantages that were thoroughly documented by a federal Royal
Commission in the 1960s have been largely eliminated. At the institu-
tional level, Quebec experiences considerable de facto, if not de jure
asymmetry. And, perhaps most important, the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada has stated unequivocally that, under certain conditions, Quebec
does have the right to secede.
Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Canada has been able to
have a profound debate about the nature of the country and the role
of Quebec it, and has been able to debate secession for 50 years, but
to do it through almost entirely democratic and peaceful means. One
thing that federalists and secessionists have in common is a prior
commitment to democratic politics.
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4.1. Catalonia/Quebec; Canada/Spain
There are of course massive differences between Canada and
Spain, in history, culture, society, and institutions. But it is no accident
that each country has great interest in the other. We are both multi-
national federations. We both must combine our bi-nationalism with
the existence of other regions and provinces that also have strong
identities and interests. We both have to continue to work out these
historic differences while also responding to larger forces of regional
integration (NAFTA and the EU) and to our increasing multicultural-
ism.
Hence many of the issues we face in our federalism debates are
the same. They include, among others: reconciling unitarian, state-
centered conceptions of the country with regional autonomy; finding
policies with respect to language that respect the rights of ‘minor-
ities within minorities’ (Anglophones in Quebec and Francophones
outside Quebec; non-Catalans in Catalonia and Catalans outside the
region); finding the ways to empower the national aspirations of Que-
bec and Catalonia (‘building out’) and also ensuring their full repre-
sentation in pan-Canadian and pan-Spanish institutions (‘building in’);
balancing symmetry and asymmetry; and so on.
In both cases, perhaps the most fundamental issue to find ways
to continue to ‘vouloir vivre ensemble.’ Much of the debate in Ca-
nada has focused on the search for common values and symbols, and
a common sense of identity and citizenship. Some minimal level of
such unity is clearly essential. But it is not the only glue. Distinct so-
cieties can continue to live together even with differing loyalties and
identities. They can do so because they share a common fate, because
their economies and societies are deeply intertwined. Whether or not
they love each other, they are in it together. This, we believe is a ne-
glected dimension of the Canadian debate; and one that may have
parallels in Spain.
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RESUM
En aquest article s’analitza la capacitat del federalisme canadenc d’articular
el caràcter dual i regionalista que defineix el Canadà a través de diferents
arguments i opinions a favor i en contra que s’han generat, tant al si de la
Federació canadenca com des de l’exterior. Des de les perspectives dels so-
biranistes quebequesos, el federalisme és una cotilla que estreny i limita el
marge de la nació quebequesa per expressar-se per si mateixa tant en el con-
text canadenc com en àmbits internacionals; per als sobiranistes quebeque-
sos el terme “nació” quebequesa implica i requereix un “estat quebequès”.
Des de les perspectives dels federalistes quebequesos (bona part dels quals
entén el Quebec com una nació sociològica i política), el futur del Quebec
està relacionat amb la seva pertinença a la Federació canadenca, si bé a una
federació que ha de reconèixer que el Quebec és una “societat diferencial”
dins el Canadà, i que ha d’assegurar que el Quebec desenvoluparà i promourà
els seus interessos com a nació. Des d’altres perspectives, el federalisme ca-
nadenc i el seu grau de descentralització, juntament amb la forta asimetria
que permet el mateix sistema, fan que el Quebec segurament gaudeixi d'un
dels nivells d’autogovern més amplis del món. Des de fora del Canadà, les
opinions van des d’aquells que estan d’acord amb aquesta darrera perspec-
tiva i, per tant, amb la asimetria, fins a aquells que entenen que el Quebec
és una més de les deu províncies existents, totes i cadascuna de les quals amb
trets propis, i que, en conseqüència, ha de ser tractat i considerat amb la ma-
teixa regla d’igualtat que estableix el sistema constitucional i polític.
ABSTRACT
This article analyses the capacity of Canadian federalism to articulate and
accommodate the dual and regionalist character defining Canada through
a range of arguments and opinions both for and against that have been ge-
nerated both within the Canadian Federation and abroad. From the stand-
point of the Quebec sovereignists, federalism is highly restrictive of the Que-
bec nation’s freedom to express itself, by itself, within the Canadian context
as well as within international ambits; for Quebec nationalists, the term
Quebec “nation” implies—indeed, requires—a “Quebec state”. But, from
the standpoint of the Quebec federalists (a good number of whom under-
stand Quebec as a sociological and political nation), the future of Quebec
lies with its membership of the Canadian Federation, however much this has
to recognise Quebec as a “differential society” within Canada, and however
much it has to ensure that Quebec will develop and promote its interests as
a nation. For yet others, the decentralist character of Canadian federalism,
and the extensive provisions for asymmetry built into the system, mean that
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Quebec is already perhaps the most powerful sub-national government in
the world, such that it already has the powers necessary to fulfil its national
destiny, within the federation. Opinion outside Quebec ranges from those
who accept this view, and embrace asymmetry, to those who argue that Que-
bec is simply one of ten existing provinces, each of which is distinct, and
which should all be treated as equals in accordance with the constitutional
and political framework.
